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Abstract
The advances introduced by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are manifold and
have paved the path for the full integration of UAVs, as intelligent objects, into the
Internet of Things (IoT). This paper brings artificial intelligence into the UAVs data
offloading process in a multi-server Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) environment,
by adopting principles and concepts from game theory and reinforcement learning.
Initially, the autonomous MEC server selection for partial data offloading is performed by the UAVs, based on the theory of the stochastic learning automata. A
non-cooperative game among the UAVs is then formulated to determine the UAVs’
data to be offloaded to the selected MEC servers, while the existence of at least one
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is proven exploiting the power of submodular games. A best
response dynamics framework and two alternative reinforcement learning algorithms
are introduced that converge to an NE, and their trade-offs are discussed. The overall
framework performance evaluation is achieved via modeling and simulation, in terms
of its efficiency and effectiveness, under different operation approaches and scenarios.
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Glossary
Artificial Intelligence the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual
perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages.
Game Theory

the branch of mathematics concerned with the analysis of strategies
for dealing with competitive situations where the outcome of a participant’s choice of action depends critically on the actions of other
participants.

Machine Learning an application of artificial intelligence (AI) that provides systems the ability to automatically learn and improve from experience
without being explicitly programmed.
Mobile Edge Computing a form of network architecture that enables cloud computing to be done at the edge of a mobile network.
Nash Equilibrium (in economics and game theory) a stable state of a system involving the interaction of different participants, in which no participant
can gain by a unilateral change of strategy if the strategies of the
others remain unchanged.
Reinforcement Learning an area of machine learning concerned with how software

ix

Glossary

agents ought to take actions in an environment so as to maximize
some notion of cumulative reward.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles an aircraft piloted by remote control or onboard computers
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Chapter 1
Introduction

As the age of the Internet of Things (IoT) steadily grows and the number of connected
devices grows into the billions, automation and control of wireless networks is at the
forefront of research. Next generation networks, like 5G and beyond are expected
to handle the capacity of multiple heterogeneous devices each with diverse computational and communication capabilities; these devices are expected to exchange and
process large amounts of data. In an effort to automate and control traffic through
the networks these devices will perform their computing tasks in an autonomous
matter. Thus, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has presented itself as a powerful tool to
support autonomous human-like decision making in next generation networked devices. AI was founded on and is supported by multi-disciplinary techniques, such
as machine learning, control theory, game theory, optimization theory, and metaheuristics [1]. Many of these mathematical models have their roots in economics;
however, as networks became more and more crowded it became imperative to use
new techniques to design future networks. Therefore, models that already set their
precedence in economics became the guiding force for AI and the evolution of next
generation networks.
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Nevertheless, applying these new models to the current network is not enough
to make improvements on future networks; not only must we apply AI and its technology, we must also change the network architecture. As a result of the increased
computational demands of the nearly billions of devices connected to the network a
new architecture representing the practice of processing data near the edge of the
network [2], otherwise known as Multi-Access Edge Computing or Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) has gained momentum as a solution to handle the increased load of
the network. More importantly, MEC meets the devices’ Quality of Service (QoS)
requirements in terms of delay, latency, and energy efficiency. Because of this, MEC
is utilized to reduce the amount of data offloading from IoT devices to the cloud
and decrease service access latency [2]. Since IoT devices have limited processing
capabilities and the overall goal is to decrease the traffic through the network and
manage it in an autonomous manner [3], MEC has presented itself as a networking
architecture capable of rapid analysis and immediate processing of data.
IoT devices are a large proponent of MEC and recently research has focused
on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones. Recently, there has
been heavy investment in the development of UAVs and multi-UAV systems that
can collaborate and complete missions more efficiently. Thus, new and developing
technologies, like 5G and beyond have significant potential on UAVs equipped with
sensors for delivering IoT services, requiring the execution of computationally intensive tasks [4]. Therefore, it is expected that UAVs will offload data in masses to the
network; in such cases, MEC arises as a powerful tool to support the operation of
these drones [5].
Motivated by the aforementioned arguments and observations, this thesis proposes an AI-driven data offloading approach to enable the UAVs to optimally offload
part of their data to a set of MEC servers for further processing by combining key
principles and methodologies from Game Theory and Reinforcement Learning.

2
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1.1

Related Work

1.1.1

Artificial Intelligence

Intelligence is defined as the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills. Such
skills include decision making, speech recognition, language translation, visual perception, and others. Therefore, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the theory and development of computer systems to apply these skills in a human-like manner while at
the same time learning to apply these skills better each time. The rise of 4G LTE,
the release of 5G, and the latest 6G white paper have been the driving forces behind
wireless networks; more specifically, mobile networks have set the tone for the rise of
AI.
The role of AI in mobile networks has been researched in [6]. AI has proven to
be a successful tool for applications such as computer vision, language processing,
and autonomous driving; with the growing trend of AI empowered applications and
IoT devices researches expect a large number of these intelligent applications to be
deployed at the edge of wireless networks. Therefore, 6G wireless networks will
be designed to leverage advanced wireless communications and mobile computing
technologies to support AI-enabled applications at various edge mobile devices with
limited communication, computation, hardware and energy resources [6]. Research
into mobile networks has set the tone for research into AI enabled heterogeneous
networks.
Also, the role of AI-based techniques and their use in heterogeneous networks
(HetNets) is discussed in [7]. Research into AI-based techniques like self - configuration, self-healing, and self-optimization as researched in [7] can be very beneficial
for architectures like MEC. In [8], the benefits that AI will have on all networking
architectures are discussed. AI enabled networks can help develop a future vision of
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cognitive networks that will show network-wide intelligent behavior to solve problems
of network heterogeneity, performance, and quality of service (QoS) [8]. Research
into AI driven networking architectures is paving the way for IoT devices to smartly
and autonomously offload/upload data to/from the network.

1.1.2

Game Theory

Game theory is the study of the ways in which interacting choices of economic agents
produce outcomes with respect to the utilities of those agents [9]. Game theory, although original a mathematical model for studying problems in economics [10], has
been applied to multiple disciplines including Political Science, Biology, and Psychology. More recently game theory has become a popular model in Computer Science
and Logic design; furthermore, cognitive radio networks have benefited greatly from
game theory. Because of the successful application of game theory in cognitive radio networks, other network architectures, such as cellular networks [11] and Mobile
Edge Computing networks, have also adopted game theory to deal with distributed
decision-making-related problems, like the resource management problem.
Game theory has been adopted in the Network Science field to deal with singleresource management problems, such power control, rate control and others. In [12],
a power management control problem in Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)based wireless networks is introduced and a non-cooperative game among the users
is formulated to determine their optimal uplink transmission power that will bring
the system in a steady state, i.e., Nash Equilibrium point. This problem has been
extended in [13], in order to consider the usage-based pricing (i.e., convex pricing
with respect to the users’ uplink transmission power) that is imposed to the users regarding their transmission and the corresponding interference that they create within
the communication environment. A similar problem is addressed in [14], considering
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linear pricing to the users’ uplink transmission power and determining the noncooperative game’s Nash Equilibrium, i.e., the users’ optimal uplink transmission
power. In [15], the problem of power control via adopting a game-theoretic approach
is addressed in multi-tier wireless communication networks, considering macro-cells
and femto-cells. Moreover, in [16], the power control problem is addressed by adopting the theory of S-modular games, i.e., when a user increases its transmission power,
the rest of the users decrease their strategy due to the increased interference in the
communication environment. This work has been extended in [17], by considering
the application in CDMA wireless cellular networks.
Game theory has been also adopted to solve resource management problems
in device-to-device communication [18], wireless powered communication networks,
where the devices charge their batteries through the radio frequency signals transmitted by the transmitter within the communication environment [19], as well as in
communication networks adopting single carrier frequency division multiple access
technique, where on top of the power that should be determined by each user, the
optimal channel allocation should also be calculated [20].
Additionally, in [21], the authors discuss game theory and its role in networking
for multiple resources [22]. In the problem of multi-resources allocation [23], the goal
is to find a Nash equilibrium state of the given network regarding QoS metrics such as
transmission power and/or rate [24]. In [25], the authors tackle the problem of power
and rate allocation in wireless cellular networks, by transforming the problem to a
single-variable non-cooperative game and determining its Nash Equilibrium. This
problem has been also addressed in [26], by directly addressing the two variables
resource management problem as a non-cooperative game, where the authors show
that it is an S-modular game and they determine its Nash Equilibrium, i.e., the
optimal uplink transmission power and data rate.
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that Game Theory is a powerful tool
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to address resource management problems in various types of wireless communication networks, considering various types of resources, multi-tier architectures, and
multiple access techniques. Also, Game Theory enables the mobile devices to make
autonomous decisions and adopt human-like behavior, therefore, it becomes a critical
part of the Artificial Intelligent initiative.
In [27, 28] the authors discuss using game theory with learning to find the pure
Nash equilibrium of the network. In each of the papers game theory is used as a
learning automaton to select a Wireless Internet Service Provider (WISP) or cell,
respectfully. In each of the papers discussed above game theory is used to guide
the network to a Nash equilibrium. Using the ideas from this research we develop a
system of UAVs that will utilize game theory coupled with learning to reach a Nash
equilibrium, i.e. where every drone has chosen an optimal MEC.

1.1.3

Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement Learning is an area of Machine Learning concerned with agents taking
a suitable action to maximize their reward. In an RL system, the agents attempt to
learn the best action to take based on interactions with an unstable environment; the
learning agent is not instructed specifically what action to take, instead it determines
the the best action which maximizes its long-term reward. The selected action causes
the current state of the environment to transition to the next state and the learning
agent receives a scalar reward value that evaluates the effect of the state transition
[29].
In [30,31] the authors present two log-linear learning algorithms, B-logit and Maxlogit; both algorithms are uncoupled and sequential, have one player perform learning
at a time. Log-linear learning is a learning algorithm that provides guarantees on
the percentage of time that the action profile will be at a potential maximizer in
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potential games [32]. Binary log-linear learning (B-logit) is a variant of log-linear
learning, its purpose is to handle constrained action sets. Therefore, B-logit is able
to handle environments where the future actions of the players are limited based on
their current action [30]. B-logit has been used in [33–35] to study Heterogeneous
Networks, Wireless Communication Networks, and Opportunistic Spectrum Access
(OSA) networks. These papers show that B-logit is an optimal algorithm in finding
the pure Nash equilibrium of the system within a few hundred iterations, given the
system is shown to be a potential game.
Max log-linear learning (Max-logit) is another variant of log-linear learning which
retains the favorable equilibrium selection property with the provably fastest convergence speed over other learning algorithms in the γ-logit family, having a convergence time that is on average 33.85% faster than B-logit [31]. Max-logit has been
used in [34–36] to study Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks, Wireless Communication Networks, and Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA) networks. Similar to
B-logit, these papers show that Max-logit is an optimal algorithm in finding the pure
Nash equilibrium of the system within a few hundred iterations, given the system
is shown to be a potential game, with the added benefit of being the fastest γ-logit
learning algorithm.

1.1.4

Mobile Edge Computing

Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is showing a rising popularity as a crucial solution
to increasing IoT devices’ QoS metrics by bringing computing resources to the edge
of the network and in close proximity to the end users. In [5, 37–43] the authors
discuss the benefits of MEC for smart mobile devices and smart objects in general.
As the age of number of smart mobile devices connected to the network grew, so
did the amount of traffic in the network; because of this increase in traffic a new
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paradigm was needed to handle this, thus the concept of MEC came to light. The
main benefits of the MEC technology are: its potential to reduce the latency, provide
location-awareness, improve the performance of the mobile applications, reduce the
energy consumption of the mobile devices by alleviating the burden of executing
their computing tasks locally, and provide accurate computing outcomes in a timewise manner [37]. As we enter further into the age of IoT billions of devices have
come online and further increased traffic through the network; therefore, MEC has
presented itself as a necessary tool for IoT devices’ data offloading.
In [5] the authors discuss using game theory and reinforcement learning to support
the autonomous and distributed operation of the MEC servers as well as the process
of data offloading by the devices. In [38] the authors research a MEC system with
multiple mobile users; a single-user MEC system is a highly researched system and
is an easy environment to control. With this research a multi-user MEC system
that utilizes game theoretic and reinforcement learning approaches to intelligently
manage the network is proposed.

1.1.5

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) , or drone is an aircraft with no human pilot on
board. UAVs are one component in an unmanned aircraft system; the entire systems
consists of the UAV, a ground-based controller, and a system of communication
between the two. UAVs were originally designed and used for military applications;
however, there has been a recent influx in drones being used for both private, public,
and commercial projects. Like most IoT devices, UAVs are constrained by their
battery power and computational capabilities. Because of these constraints we must
consider ways to reduce transmission power and reduce the amount of data that is
processed locally. Therefore, UAVs will benefit greatly from the MEC architecture.
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In [44–47] the authors discuss utilizing UAVs in Public Safety Networks (PSNs)
and how to control and automate the drones to improve energy efficiency. In [44, 45]
the authors utilize the theory of minority games to have the drones perform their
tasks in an independent and distributed manner, then they apply a non-cooperative
game theoretic approach to optimize the drones’ uplink transmission power. In [46]
the authors utilize prospect theory to find a pure Nash equilibrium of the system.
Lastly, in [47] the authors suggest a UAV-assisted public safety system based on
game theory and reinforcement learning; using a binary log-linear learning algorithm
the authors were able to prove a pure Nash equilibrium state of the system with
regards to the drones’ cost function.
The above literature shows one use for drones, that being for disaster stricken
areas. However, as 5G networks and beyond evolve further the use of drones becomes
diverse. Drones can be used in private, public, or commercial projects to perform
certain compute intensive tasks (i.e. facial recognition or detection and prevention).

1.2

Contributions & Outline

Despite the significant advances that have been obtained in each of the aforementioned areas in isolation, limited research work has been performed in empowering
the UAVs’ operation and decision-making with adopting the AI technology. AI techniques have been traditionally focused on machine learning frameworks with applications primarily in robotics and image processing, by mainly adopting the artificial
neural networks [48]. Game theory has arisen as a crucial element and aspect in AI
today, gaining ground in particular in multi-agent systems. In principle, multiple
agents can either compete or collaborate to accomplish a task with accuracy and
efficiency - the foundation for reinforcement learning in AI. In this paper we adopt
a similar philosophy and perspective to support the UAVs autonomous intelligent
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decision making by adopting game theory and reinforcement learning [1].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in the existing literature where
the use of AI techniques, e.g., reinforcement learning and game theory, enables the
UAVs to promote human-like decision-making, in terms of selecting a MEC server to
offload their computational tasks, and determining the optimal amount of offloaded
data to maximize the perceived QoS. The key scientific contributions of our work,
that differentiate it from the rest of the existing literature, are summarized as follows:
1. A multi-UAVs and multi-MEC servers environment is considered. The utility
of each UAV is formulated as a function of the amount of data that is offloaded
to a selected MEC server considering the UAV’s transmission cost, the local
computing cost, as well as the impact on its perceived QoS by the transmission
cost of the rest of the UAVs in combination with the exploitation of the MEC
server’s computing resources (chapter 2).
2. Based on the theory of submodular games, artificial intelligence is embodied
in the decision of the optimal data offloading of each UAV (Section 3.1). A
non-cooperative game among the UAVs is formulated with the objective to
maximize each UAV’s utility function. The game is proven to be submodular,
and thus the existence of an NE is shown (Section 3.2).
3. Towards each UAV determining the NE in an autonomous manner, three algorithms are proposed: (i) Best Response Dynamics (Section 3.3), (ii) Max
Log-Linear (Max-logit) learning, and (iii) Binary Log-Linear (B-logit) learning. The latter two algorithms are based on the principles of reinforcement
learning (Section 3.4).
4. The MEC server selection by each UAV is achieved by intelligently considering
each server’s reward function depending on its relative computing capability
and distance from the UAVs, as well as the QoS that it can potentially provide
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to the UAVs. Each UAV acts as a stochastic learning automaton (SLA), which
intelligently selects a MEC server to process its data (chapter 4).
5. A series of simulation experiments are realized to evaluate the performance
and the inherent attributes of the proposed artificial intelligent UAVs’ data
offloading approach in the mobile edge computing environment, while a detailed
comparative numerical study is presented to demonstrate its benefits (chapter
5). Finally, chapter 6 concludes the paper.
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Chapter 2
System Model and UAV’s Utility
Function
The communication and computing environment described within is defined as:
1. the set of MEC servers S = {1, . . . , s, . . . , |S|}, and
2. the set of UAVs D = {1, . . . , d, . . . , |D|}
denoted as |S| and |D|, respectively. Each UAV has a computing task defined as:

Td = (Id , Cd , φd )
where Id [bits] denotes the total input bits of the computation and Cd [CP U cycles]
denotes the number of CPU cycles required to carry out the computing task Td .
cycles
] designates the computational complexity
Additionally, the parameter φd [ CP Ubits

of the computing task requested by the UAV; the value of φd depends on the nature
of the application, therefore, a higher φd value indicates a more computationally
intensive task. Additionally, each MEC server s ∈ S has a computational capability
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cycles
], this computational capability Fs defines the MEC server’s
denoted by Fs [ CP Usec

ability to process all of the UAVs offloaded data. Likewise, each UAV d ∈ D has a
cycles
local computational capability denoted by Fd [ CP Usec
]; additionally, the parameter

ρd [ CPWUatts
] denotes the UAVs local power consumption to process the (remaining)
cycles
data from the computing task. We consider that each UAV has a fixed maximum
power to transmit its data to the chosen MEC server denoted by P M ax .
Each UAV d ∈ D selects one MEC server s ∈ S to offload either a portion or all of
its data in order for the UAVs computing task to be processed, while the remaining
data of the computing task are processed locally by the UAV. Therefore, each UAV
decides in an autonomous and distributed manner to offload bd bits of data to the
selected MEC server, while the rest of the computational task’s data i.e., (Id − bd )
bits, are processed locally by the UAV, where bd ∈ Ad = [0, Id ].
A holistic utility function for each UAV is defined below. The utility function
captures the UAV’s perceived QoS prerequisites’ satisfaction by processing its data
in the selected MEC server. The holistic utility function is introduced in six factors,
however the factors are not meant to be viewed as just parts but instead understood
and then viewed as a whole.
The first term of the UAV’s utility function represents its perceived satisfaction
from offloading a part or all of its computational task’s data and is defined as follows:
P

w 1 bd (

X

∀s∈S

Fs − ∀s∈S
P
∀d∈D

Fs
Id

wFd
P

Fd

e ∀d∈D

P
X
∀i6=d

bi − ∀s∈S
P
∀d∈D

Fs
Id

bd )

(2.1a)

Term 2.1a is an increasing term, i.e. as the value of bd increases, the UAV’s perceived satisfaction also increases; this is because, as the UAV offloads more of its
computational task’s data, it will save more of its personal resources. Nevertheless,
this term is also driven by the overall computational capability of the entire MEC
system and the amount of data the other UAVs offload to the MEC system. That is
to say, as the other UAVs offload more data to the MEC system the less the system
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will be able to serve the UAV, therefore driving the UAV to offload less data. The
second term of the UAV’s utility function represents the UAV’s transmission cost
and is defined as follows:
−

w2 P M ax bd
Id

(2.1b)

Term 2.1b is a decreasing term, i.e. as the percentage of bits offloaded increases, the
power required to transmit those bits from the UAV to the MEC server increases,
thus lowering the UAV’s perceived satisfaction. The third term of the UAV’s utility
function represents the robustness of the MEC system by observing the amount of
bits that the other UAVs offload and is defined as follows:
−

w2 P M ax c X
bi
Id
∀i6=d

(2.1c)

In term 2.1c the constant c is a negative constant where −1 < c < 0; therefore, term
2.1c is an increasing term. With that said, if the rest of the UAVs tend to offload
large amounts of their computational task’s bits to be processed by the MEC system
then the examined UAV receives positive feedback, i.e. the UAV perceives the MEC
system as being robust. The fourth term of the UAV’s utility function represents the
UAV’s local computing cost associated with processing the remaining data locally
and is defined as follows:
−w3 (Id − bd )φd ρd

(2.1d)

Term 2.1d is a decreasing term, i.e. as the number of bits processed locally by the
UAV increases, the UAV’s perceived satisfaction decreases. The fifth term of the
UAV’s utility function observes the amount of data offloaded by the other UAVs
relative to the computational capability of the entire MEC system as is defined as
follows:
w1 c

X
∀s∈S

Fs

X

(2.1e)

bi

∀i6=d
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Term 2.1e is an decreasing term that serves as positive feedback to the UAV, i.e. the
examined UAV tends to offload more of its computational task’s bits if it observes
the other UAVs tending to the same behavior. Lastly, the sixth term of the UAV’s
utility function captures the cost that the UAV experiences by the exploitation of the
MEC system’s computational capabilities by itself and the other UAVs. The sixth
term is defined as follows:
wF

Fs X
bd
Fs P dFd
∀s∈S
∀s∈S
bi [ P
(
bi ) + P
e ∀d∈D ]
−w1 c
I
I
d
d
∀i6=d
∀i6=d
P

P

X

∀d∈D

(2.1f)

∀d∈D

Term 2.1f is an increasing term, i.e. as the examined UAV and the other UAVs tend
to utilize the MEC system’s overall computational capabilities, the examined UAV’s
perceived satisfaction increases.
As stated, the terms are not meant to be viewed as individual equations or
separate parts, they are meant to be viewed as pieces that go together to form one
holistic utility function as shown below:
P

Ud (bd , b−d ) = w1 bd (

X

∀s∈S

P

− ∀s∈S
P
∀d∈D

Fs
Id

bd ) −

Fs − ∀s∈S
P
∀d∈D

wFd
P

Fs
Id

Fd

X

e ∀d∈D

w2 P M ax bd w2 P M ax c X
−
bi
Id
Id
∀i6=d

− w3 (Id − bd )φd ρd + w1 c

X
∀s∈S

Fs

X

bi

∀i6=d

(2.2)

bi

∀i6=d
wF

Fs X
bd
Fs P dFd
X
∀s∈S
(
bi ) + P
e ∀d∈D ]
− w1 c
bi [ ∀s∈S
P
I
I
d ∀i6=d
d
∀i6=d
P

∀d∈D

P

∀d∈D

In equation 2.2 w, w1 , w2 and w3 are positive constants which represent weighting
parameters. These weighting parameters are specifically selected to ensure each
individual term of the UAVs utility function has the same order of magnitude. Thus,
presented is a holistic utility function utilized by each UAV to capture its perceived
QoS prerequisites’ satisfaction based on the amount of data that is offloaded to a
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selected MEC server considering the UAV’s transmission cost, the local computing
cost, as well as the impact on its perceived QoS by the transmission cost of the rest
of the UAVs in combination with the exploitation of the MEC server’s computing
resources.

Stochastic Learning Automata
MEC Server Selection

bd*

Best
Response
Dynamics
Algorithm

*
d

Id - b

time

iterations
time slot t

iteration ite

Max LogLinear
Algorithm

bd*

Binary
Log-Linear
Algorithm

Data Offloading

Figure 2.1: Artificial Intelligence Empowered UAVs Data Offloading Framework in
Mobile Edge Computing

Figure 2.1 depicts the proposed AI-empowered UAVs data offloading model in
a mobile edge computing environment; the proposed model consists of UAVs determining in an intelligent and autonomous matter how much of their computing task’s
data to offload and to which MEC server to offload that data. In the first stage, each
UAV acts as a stochastic learning automaton (SLA). In the SLA stage each UAV
determines the optimal MEC server to offload its data in each time slot (chapter 4).
After completion of SLA and within the duration of the same time slot, each UAV
determines its data offloading strategy, i.e. to which MEC server to offload to (determined in SLA stage) and how much of the computing task’s data to offload. This
is determined via the UAVs participating in a non-cooperative game (chapter 3). In
order to determine the Nash Equilibrium of the non-cooperative game we propose
three algorithms: the best response dynamics, max log-linear, and binary log-linear.
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In the network, each UAV acts as an artificial intelligence node by making decisions
in an autonomous matter as to which MEC server to offload to as well as how much of
its computing task’s data to offload to that server. In this chapter, a non-cooperative
game-theoretic approach based on the theory of submodular games is presented. This
environment will enable the UAVs to decide the optimal amount of data to offload
to the optimal MEC server in a human-like manor via learning. The process of the
MEC server selection via SLA will be discussed in chapter 4.
As a non-cooperative game the proposed environment consists of agents (i.e. the
UAVs) seeking to maximize their utility in a selfish manner. In this chapter we will
discuss the consequences of an agent attempting to increase their utility by changing
their strategy on the other agents in the system. Additionally, we will discuss three
algorithms, i.e. Best Response Dynamics and two RL approaches – Max Log-linear
and Binary Log-linear – that enable to UAVs to update their strategies and ultimately
maximize their utility in a distributed and intelligent manner.
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3.1

Data Offloading: An S-Modular Game Perspective

The game, G = [D, {Ad }d∈D , {Ud }d∈D ] is a non-cooperative game formulated by the
UAVs; as stated before, D is the set of UAVs, Ad = [0, Id ] is the set of data that the
UAV d needs to process for the computation task Td , and Ud denotes the UAV’s utility
function. The outcome of the game is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) b∗ = [b∗1 , . . . , b∗|D| ],
where b∗ denotes the amount of data that each UAV offloads. The NE is a stable
point for the overall multi-UAVs and multi-MEC servers system examined herein. At
the NE, each UAV offloads an amount of its computing task’s data to the selected
MEC server in order to maximize its utility function, as follows:
max Ud (bd , b−d ),

bd ∈Ad

∀d ∈ D,
(3.1)

s.t.

0 ≤ bd ≤ Id

Towards proving the existence of at least one NE of the non-cooperative game G as
a solution to the maximization problem represented by equation 3.1, we will adopt
one theory of S-modular games.
We propose that the non-cooperative game presented herein has the S-modular
type structure introduced by Topkis in [49]. These forms of non-cooperative games
exhibit interesting properties that are important in applications; these properties
include:
1. a Nash equilibrium exists
2. it (the NE) can be attained using greedy best-response type algorithms, and
3. best response policies are monotone in other players’ policies [50].
Games that are S-modular fall into two categories, either supermodular or submodular. We start of by defining supermodular games as games characterized by strategic
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complementarities, i.e. when one player increases its strategy, the other players follow suite. Supermodular games are simple and well behaved and are known to have
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Supermodular games are analytically appealing and
they have an outstanding property, that being that many solutions yield the same
predictions [51].
In [51,52] the authors attempt to utilize the theory of supermodularity to show the
existence of at least one unique Nash equilibrium. In [51] the theory of supermodular
games is used to analyze a game with a multidimensional strategy space, i.e. the
users’ uplink transmission power and data rate allocation; likewise, in [52] the theory
of supermodular games is used to analyze a game with a single dimensional strategy
space, i.e. the users’ transmission power. Albeit, in [52] the proposed game was not
supermodular and in [51] the proposed game was not supermodular without first
modifying the strategy space, this is because the games did not meet the following
requirement:

Definition 1 the utility fi for player i is supermodular if and only if ∀x, y ∈ S the
following holds true [50]
fi (x ∧ y) + fi (x ∨ y) ≥ fi (x) + fi (y)

Remark 1 if it is submodular, then the opposite inequality holds true.

We also note that if fi is twice differentiable, then supermodularity is equivalent to:
∂ 2 fi (x)
≥0
∂xi ∂xj
for all x ∈ S and j 6= i.

Remark 2 if it is submodular, then the opposite inequality holds true.
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A submodular game is a game characterized by diminishing returns, i.e. adding
an element to a smaller subset of S makes a bigger difference to the function values
than adding it to a larger subset of S [53]. In [53] the authors utilize the theory
of submodular games to show the existence of a pure Nash Equilibrium in their
non-cooperative game. Additionally, submodular games exhibit the characteristic of
strategic substitutes, i.e. when one player decides to increase its action, the other
players follow up by lowering their action since they perceive a negative feedback
from the system. We propose that our non-cooperative game displays characteristics
of submodular games.
Definition 2 The non-cooperative game G is submodular, if for all the UAVs, the
following conditions hold true.
1. Ad is a compact subset of an Euclidean space.
2. Ud (bd , b−d ) is smooth, submodular in bd , and has non-increasing differences in
(bd , b−d ), i.e.,

∂ 2 Ud (bd ,b−d )
∂bd ∂bi

≤ 0.

The submodular games are characterized by strategic substitutes implying that
an increase in the actions of one UAV leads the other UAVs to decrease their actions,
i.e., amount of offloaded data, accordingly. In a submodular game, there always exist
external equilibria: a largest element bd = sup{bd ∈ Ad : BR(bd , b−d ) ≥ bd } and a
smallest element bd = inf {bd ∈ Ad : BR(bd , b−d ) ≤ bd } of the equilibrium set, where
BR(·) denotes the UAV’s d, d ∈ D best response strategy to other UAVs’ strategies.

3.2

Problem Solution

The theory of submodularity captures the UAVs data offloading problem very well,
given that if a UAV increases its action, i.e. decides to offload a larger percentage of
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its computing task’s bits, then the interference in the communication environment
increases and the MEC system has to process more data. Therefore, the rest of the
UAVs experience congestion in both the communication and computing environments
and accordingly lower their actions, i.e. decide to offload a lower percentage of their
computing task’s bits.

Theorem 1 The non-cooperative game G = [D, {Ad }d∈D , {Ud }d∈D ] is submodular
for all bd ∈ Ad and has at least one Nash Equilibrium.

Proof 1 The strategy space Ad = [0, Id ] is a compact subset of an Euclidean space.
The UAV’s utility function Ud (bd , b−d ), as defined in Eq. 2.2, is smooth, as it
has derivatives of all orders everywhere in its domain Ad . Towards showing that
the utility function Ud (bd , b−d ) is submodular and has non-increasing differences in
(bd , b−d ), we determine its second order partial derivative, as follows.
F

Pd ·w
Fs
Fd
∂ 2 Ud (bd , b−d )
∀d∈D
= − ∀s∈S
(1 + c)w1
·
e
P
∂bd ∂bi
Id
P

∀d∈D

We conclude that

∂ 2 Ud (bd ,b−d )
∂bd ∂bi

≤ 0, as 1 + c ≥ 0, thus the non-cooperative game

G is submodular and has at least one Nash Equilibrium, which is defined as:
b∗d = argmax Ud (bd , b−d )
bd ∈Ad

Thus, the UAV data offloading problem proposed is a non-cooperative, submodular game. As stated above, S-modular type games are known to have at least one
Nash equilibrium and the NE can be found using greedy best response type algorithms. Therefore, described below is the best response dynamics approach used to
determine the NE of the UAVs data offloading problem.
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3.3

Best Response Dynamics (BRD) Approach

A best response dynamics approach is adopted in order to enable the UAVs to determine the optimal amount of their computing task’s bits to offload to the MEC server.
The best response algorithm will allow the UAVs’ strategies to converge to the NE.
Based on this, the UAVs make intelligent, human-like data offloading decisions in an
autonomous matter. The UAVs best response strategy in the Euclidean space Ad is
denoted as:
BR(bd , b−d ) = b∗d = argmax Ud (bd , b−d )

(3.2)

bd ∈Ad

Theorem 2 In the non-cooperative game G = [D, {Ad }d∈D , {Ud }d∈D ], the UAVs’
strategies converge to a Nash Equilibrium.

Proof 2 In order to prove that the UAVs’ strategies converge to a NE, we have to
prove that each UAV’s best response strategy is a standard function. A function f
is standard, if the following three conditions hold true.
A Positivity: f (x) > 0;
B Monotonicity: if x ≥ x0 , then f (x) ≥ f (x0 ), and
C Scalability: for all a > 1, af (x) ≥ f (ax) for all x > 0, where x = [x1 , . . . , x|D| ]
is a NE.
Regarding the non-cooperative game G = [D, {Ad }d∈D , {Ud }d∈D ], we can easily
show that the above three conditions hold true, as follows.
A bd > 0, thus BR(bd , b−d ) > 0, via Eq. 3.2;
B If bd ≥ b0d , then via Eq. 3.2 we have BR(bd , b−d ) ≥ BR(b0d , b−d ), and
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C For all a > 1, BR(bd , b−d ) is monotonous with respect to bd in Ad , thus
aBR(bd , b−d ) ≥ BR(abd , b−d ).

The algorithm that implements the aforementioned UAVs’ best response dynamics converging to the non-cooperative game G’s NE is presented in Algorithm 1. The
complexity of the BRD algorithm is O(|D|Ite), Ite >> |D| (Chapter 5), where Ite
is the total number of iterations required for the algorithm to converge to the NE.
Algorithm 1 Best Response Dynamics
1: Input: S, D, Td , ρd , ∀d ∈ D
2: Output: Profile Strategy at NE: b∗d
3: Initialization: ite = 0, Convergence = 0, bd (ite=0)
4: while Convergence == 0 do
5:

ite = ite + 1;

6:

for d=1 to D do

7:

∗(ite)

UAV d determines bd

8:

end for

9:

if bd ∗(ite) == bd ∗(ite−1) then

10:
11:

(ite)

w.r.t. b−d ∗(ite−1) (Eq.3.2) and receives Ud

Convergence = 1
end if

12: end while

3.4

Reinforcement Learning Approach

As alternatives to the Best Response Dynamics approach described above, two Reinforcement Learning algorithms will be utilized, namely the Binary Log-Linear (Blogit) and Max Log-Linear (Max-logit) algorithms. These algorithms will be utilized
as artificial intelligence algorithms to enable the UAVs to decide in an autonomous
and distributed manner the amount of their computing task’s data that each one
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should offload to their chosen MEC server. These approaches require no information exchange between the UAVs in order for the non-cooperative game G to
converge to the NE. The Binary Log-Linear and Max Log-Linear algorithms convergence to a NE is proven in [54]. In B-logit and Max-logit algorithms, we assume
that each UAV has a discrete space of strategies from which it can choose from, i.e.
max
bd ∈ Ad = {bmin
} and initially it selects a random amount of information
d , . . . , bd
(ite=0)

bd

(ite=0)

with equal probability P r(bd

1
.
|Ad |

) =

At each iteration the algorithm

selects a random UAV to perform exploration and learning, while the other UAVs
maintain their previous strategy. Therefore, at the ite iteration the UAV d explores
an alternative amount of information b0d (ite) as its new strategy with equal probability
1
;
|Ad |

(ite)

the UAV then receives a respective utility Ud0 (ite) (b0d (ite) , b−d ) associated with

exploring the chosen strategy (exploration phase). At the ite iteration, UAV d updates its strategy, i.e. the amount of its computing task’s data that it will offload to
the MEC server, according to the following probabilistic learning rules, i.e., Eq. 3.3a
and 3.3b regarding the B-logit approach, and Eq. 3.3c and 3.3d with reference to the
Max-logit approach, while the rest of the UAVs maintain their previously selected
strategy (learning phase).
0 (ite)

(ite)
P r(bd

0 (ite)

= bd

)=

eUd
(ite−1)

e Ud

·β

·β
0 (ite)

+ eUd
(ite−1)

(ite)
P r(bd

=

(ite−1)
bd
)

=

eUd
(ite−1)

e Ud

·β

0 (ite)

= bd

)=

·β
0 (ite)

+ e Ud

0 (ite)

(ite)
P r(bd

eUd

(ite−1)

max(eUd

(ite−1)

where bd

=

(ite−1)
bd
)

(ite−1)

, Ud

=

·β

e Ud

(ite−1)

max(eUd

(3.3b)

·β

·β
0 (ite)

, eUd

(ite−1)

(ite)
P r(bd

(3.3a)

·β

(3.3c)
)

·β

·β

0 (ite)

, eUd

(3.3d)
)

are the UAV’s d strategy and utility at the (ite − 1) iteration,

respectively. The B-logit and Max-logit algorithms are presented below in Algorithm
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2 and Algorithm 3. The complexity of the Max-logit/B-logit algorithm is O(Ite0 ),
Ite0 >> |D| (Chapter 5), where Ite0 is the total number of iterations required for
the algorithms to converge to the NE.

25

Chapter 3. Artificial Intelligent UAV’s Data Offloading

Algorithm 2 B-logit
1: Input: S, D, Td , ρd , ∀d ∈ D
2: Output: Profile Strategy at NE: b∗d
3: Initialization: β = 1000,  = 1018 , T , ite = 0, Convergence = 0, bd (ite=0)
4: while Convergence == 0 do
5:

ite = ite + 1;

6:

UAV d selects bd

0 (ite)

(ite)

bd
7:

9:
10:

0 (ite)
1
, receives Ud
and updates
|Ad |

based on Eq.3.3a, 3.3b
(ite)

(ite−1)

The other UAVs keep their previous actions, i.e., b−d = b−d
|D|
T
P
P

8:

with equal probability

(ite)

(Ud

) |D|
P ite
if |( ite=0 d=1
−
Ud )|≤  then
T
d=1
Convergence = 1
end if

11: end while

Algorithm 3 Max-logit
1: Input: S, D, Td , ρd , ∀d ∈ D
2: Output: Profile Strategy at NE: b∗d
3: Initialization: β = 1000,  = 1018 , T , ite = 0, Convergence = 0, bd (ite=0)
4: while Convergence == 0 do
5:

ite = ite + 1;

6:

UAV d selects bd

0 (ite)

(ite)

bd
7:

9:
10:

0 (ite)
1
, receives Ud
and updates
|Ad |

based on Eq.3.3c, 3.3d
(ite)

(ite−1)

The other UAVs keep their previous actions, i.e., b−d = b−d
|D|
T
P
P

8:

with equal probability

(ite)

(Ud

) |D|
P ite
if |( ite=0 d=1
−
Ud )|≤  then
T
d=1
Convergence = 1
end if

11: end while
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MEC Server Selection Through
Reinforcement Learning
This chapter introduces a reinforcement learning algorithm based on the theory of
stochastic learning automata (SLA). In the SLA algorithm, the game is played once
in every slot according to the mixed strategy profile of the players. In every slot, the
players receive a payoff and update their strategy profile based on the payoff. If the
chosen action receives a positive payoff, then the probability the player will choose the
same action again increases; whereas, the probability of choosing the other actions
decreases. This updating strategy is known in the literature as linear reward-inaction
and is the update strategy used in the following SLA algorithm. Since the strategy
update of each player solely relies on that player’s individual information, the linear
reward-inaction is considered to be completely distributed. For this reason, the SLA
algorithm is an efficient solution for the incomplete, dynamic and uncertain information in wireless communication networks [55]. In [55] the authors further investigate
the usage of the SLA algorithm in distributed wireless games; it is determined that
the SLA algorithm is a powerful tool for wireless networks and can be applied to
various wireless optimization problems. For this reason, we explore SLA as a means
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for enabling the UAVs to select and optimal MEC server as described below.
The proposed SLA algorithm will enable the UAVs to select the most beneficial
MEC server to process their computing task’s bits. Each MEC server will be characterized by a reputation score. This reputation score increases as the MEC server’s
relative computational capability increases, as well as when the utilities of the users
served by the examined MEC server increase. In addition, if the MEC server’s relative distance from the users decreases, the reputation score increases. The formal
definition of the MEC servers’ reputation score is presented in Eq. 4.1.
P

(
rs =

PFs
∀s∈S

Fs

Ud,sd

P∀d∈D
P

∀s∈S ∀d∈D

P

Ud,sd

)
(4.1)

dd,sd

P∀d∈D
P

∀s∈S ∀d∈D

dd,sd

where sd denotes the MEC server that UAV d chooses to offload a portion of its
computing task’s data to and dd,sd [m] denotes the distance of UAV d from the MEC
server sd that is serving it.
Initially, each UAV acts as an SLA gathering information from the system and
learning the most beneficial MEC server to offload a part of its computing task’s
data for further processing, while dynamically adapting to the multi-UAVs multiMEC servers environment. In each iteration of the SLA, each UAV selects a MEC
server to offload its data in a probabilistic manner by using the following action
probabilities:
P rd,s (t + 1) = P rd,s (t) + brs (t)(1 − P rd,s (t)),
P rd,s (t + 1) = P rd,s (t) − brs (t)P rd,s (t),

s(t+1) = s(t)

s(t+1) 6= s(t)

(4.2a)
(4.2b)

where b, defined as 0 < b < 1 is a step-size parameter that determines the convergence
time of the SLA algorithm. Eq. 4.2a presents the probability P rd,s (t + 1) of UAV d
in the time slot t + 1 of selecting the same MEC server to be served from as in time
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slot t, while eq. 4.2b presents the probability of a UAV to select a different MEC
server than the one that was serving the UAV in the previous time slot. It is noted
that as the time evolves, each UAV selects per time slot a MEC server to partially
offload its data, and within the time slot, each UAV determines the NE (Chapter 3)
by following any of the three alternative approaches, i.e., best response dynamics,
B-logit, and Max-logit.
The algorithm that implements the aforementioned UAVs’ MEC server selection
is presented below in Algorithm 4. Assuming the SLA component uses the BRD algorithm for the data offloading decision-making component, which as shown in Chapter
3.3 has a complexity of O(|D|Ite), then the algorithm’s complexity is O(T (|D|Ite)),
where T is the total number of time slots required for the SLA to converge. Since
the total number of time slots, T , scales well with the total number of drones, |D|
(Chapter 5), the SLA approach is characterized by low complexity.
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Algorithm 4 SLA
1: Input: S; D; Fs , ∀s ∈ S; dd,sd , ∀d ∈ D, ∀s ∈ S; Ud,sd , ∀d ∈ D, ∀s ∈ S; b
2: Output: Profile Strategy at NE: MEC server s ∈ S that each UAV d ∈ D will

be served by
3: Initialization: t = 0; P rd,s (0) =

1
;
|S|

Convergence = 0

4: while Convergence == 0 do
5:
6:

for d = 1 to |D| do
UAV d chooses a MEC server s to offload its data to based on its action
probability vector P rd,s (t) = [P rd,1 , . . . , P rd,|S| ]

7:

end for

8:

Run BRD (or Max-logit/B-logit)

9:

for s = 1 to |S| do

10:

MEC s determines the corresponding reputation score rs (4.1) based on the
UAVs that want to offload their data to it

11:

end for

12:

for d = 1 to |D| do

13:

for ∀s ∈ S do
if s(t+1) = st then

14:

Eq. 4.2a

15:

else

16:

Eq. 4.2b

17:
18:

end if

19:

end for

20:

end for

21:

Check for convergence

22:

if ∀d ∈ D, ∃sd ∈ S : |P rd,s (t) − 1|≤ ,  → 0 then

23:
24:
25:
26:

Convergence = 0
else
t=t+1
end if

27: end while
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Numerical Results
In this chapter, a detailed numerical evaluation of the proposed data offloading framework in a multi-UAVs multi-MEC environment is conducted. Initially, the performance evaluation focuses on the pure operation characteristics of the proposed game
theoretic data offloading framework (Section 5.1), under the best response dynamics
(BRD) algorithm. Afterwards, the performance evaluation of the two alternative
reinforcement learning approaches (i.e., Max-logit and B-logit) to determine the optimal amount of offloaded data for each UAV, is studied in Section 5.2. Additionally,
a comparative analysis of the performance of the best response dynamics approach
against the Max-logit and B-logit algorithms is also presented.
In the subsequent analysis, considered is a multi-UAVs multi-MEC servers environment consisting of |S|= 3 MEC servers and |D|= 80 UAVs, where each UAV’s
distance is randomly and uniformly distributed in the interval (10m, 400m). Also, for
demonstration purposes only, the following system parameterizations are assumed:
• Fs ∈ [1, 5]1012 CP U cycles/sec
for each MEC server, and:
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• Id = [20, 100]M Bytes
• Cd = [1, 5]109 CP U cycles
• φd = Cd /Id
• ρd = 130W/CP U cycles
• w = 50, w1 = 1, w2 = 1.47 · 1020 , and w3 = 106 ,
• P M ax = 2W

for each UAV. The proposed framework’s evaluation was conducted via modeling
and simulation and executed in a MacBook Pro Laptop, 2.5GHz Intel Core i7, with
16GB LPDDR3 available RAM.

5.1

Pure Game Theoretic Framework Operation
Evaluation

Below we present the outcome of the BRD algorithm in Fig. 5.1. On the left vertical
axis is the UAVs’ average achieved utility and on the right vertical axis is the average
amount of offloaded data to the MEC servers; this is presented as a function of the
BRD algorithm’s iterations (bottom horizontal axis) and the actual execution time
required for the algorithm to converge to the NE (top horizontal axis). The results
reveal that the BRD algorithm converges to the NE is in less than 10 iterations which
corresponds to less than 1 millisecond, indicating that each UAV determines its data
offloading strategy in a relatively fast manner.
Referencing the MEC server selection part of the framework, Fig. 5.2 presents
the operation of the SLA algorithm, which enables the UAVs to select a MEC server
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Figure 5.1: Best Response Dynamics

to offload a percentage of their computing task’s bits. For the following numerical
results, the SLA algorithm’s learning parameter is defined as b = 0.7. Fig. 5.2a
presents, for a randomly selected UAV, the convergence of the action probabilities
towards one of the three MEC servers; Fig. 5.2a shows that the UAVs conclude to the
selection of an optimal MEC server relatively fast, occurring in less than 40 iterations
(equivalent to less than 1 second). Additionally, in the included subfigure a Monte
Carlo analysis is performed for 10, 000 runs of the SLA algorithm for the following
range of values of the learning parameter: b = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1. From the results of
this Monte Carlo analysis we conclude that as the learning parameter b increases,
the UAVs do not take as much time to explore the available MEC server options,
and thus converge to a selection faster, requiring less time and less iterations.
Fig. 5.2b depicts the evolution of the MEC servers’ reputation score (left vertical
axis) according to Eq. 4.1 and the corresponding UAVs’ average action probability
per MEC server (right vertical axis). From the data, we observe that the MEC server
with the highest reputation score also achieves a higher average probability of being
chosen to be served by a UAV over the other MEC servers; thus, the MEC server with
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the highest reputation score attracts more UAVs to offload their data to it. Fig. 5.2c
confirms this observation; in Fig. 5.2c, the MEC server with the highest reputation
score, i.e. MEC server 3, attracts more UAVs. Additionally, those UAVs that are
served by MEC server 3 achieve a higher average utility than the rest. Consequently,
MEC server 3 (or in general, the MEC server with the highest reputation score) will
also receive an increase in the amount of data offloaded to it from the UAVs it serves
compared with the other MEC servers (see Fig. 5.2d).
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5.2

Reinforcement Learning and Comparative
Evaluation

Initially, in this section the behavior of the two reinforcement learning approaches
(i.e., Max-logit and B-logit) introduced in Section 3.4 is studied and analyzed. Additionally, the convergence of these two algorithms, used as alternatives to the BRD
algorithm, towards determining the optimal amount of each UAV’s computing task’s
data to offload is also analyzed. In particular Fig. 5.3a (Fig. 5.3c) and Fig. 5.3b
(Fig. 5.3d), present the UAVs’ welfare i.e., summation of all the UAVs’ utilities, and
the UAVs’ average amount of offloaded data respectively, for the Max-Logit (B-Logit)
algorithm, as a function of the corresponding required iterations (bottom horizontal
axis) and actual execution time (upper horizontal axis) and for different values of
the learning parameter β.
Regarding the two RL approaches, the results reveal that both converge to the
NE, by following the exploration and learning phases; however, the time required
to converge to the NE is achieved in a slower manner than compared to the BRD
algorithm, e.g. the BRD algorithm converges in milliseconds whereas the two RL
approaches converge in seconds. This increased convergence time is explained by the
exploration phase performed by the learning algorithms in order to learn the data
offloading strategy; whereas the BRD algorithm learns the data offloading strategy
by performing the optimization presented in Eq. 3.2. Moreover, it is confirmed
that the Max-logit algorithm converges to the NE faster than the B-logit algorithm.
Additionally, both algorithms show that for greater values of the learning parameter
β, the UAVs converge to a better NE in terms of amount of data offloaded [55] (Fig.
5.3b and 5.3d). Therefore, by offloading a greater portion of their computing task’s
data, each UAV achieves a greater utility, and consequently, their overall welfare is
also greater (as shown in Fig. 5.3a for Max-logit and 5.3c for B-logit).
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Subsequently, a comparative analysis of the BRD algorithm against the aforementioned reinforcement learning paradigm, in terms of the performance of the overall
proposed framework, is presented. For the comparison, we choose the Max-logit algorithm among the reinforcement learning ones, since it presented better results compared to the B-logit algorithm, as discussed above. Specifically, Fig. 5.4a presents
the UAVs’ amount of offloaded data at the NE as a function of the UAVs’ IDs for
the game-theoretic BRD algorithm and Max-logit reinforcement learning algorithm,
considering different action space sizes, i.e., 10, 1, 000, and 10, 000 available actions.
The results reveal that as the number of available actions increases, the Maxlogit algorithm converges to values of the amount of offloaded data closer to the
BRD algorithm’s values, thus, the corresponding mean square error decreases (Fig.
5.4b). In that respect the reinforcement learning approach (i.e., Max-logit) can
achieve similar results as the game-theoretic approach (i.e., BRD); however, without
requiring any information exchange among the UAVs, i.e., the data offloading vector
of the rest of the UAVs b−d . Specifically, it is also observed that the Max-logit
algorithm converges to a better NE among the available ones compared to the BRD
algorithm, even for a small number of available data offloading actions. Accordingly,
the UAVs achieve greater utilities under the Max-logit algorithm (Fig. 5.4c) as they
offload more data to the MEC servers for further processing (Fig. 5.4a).
Moreover, Fig. 5.4d and Fig. 5.4e present the UAVs’ average utility and the
execution time of the BRD, Max-logit, and B-logit algorithms. The results illustrate
that the UAVs achieve a greater average utility under the Max-logit algorithm, as
they converge to a better NE among the available ones as explained before (Fig.
5.4a). Also, the BRD algorithm has the smallest execution time, as it practically
solves a closed-form optimization problem, i.e., Eq. 3.2, and the UAVs do not invest
time in the exploration phase, unlike the reinforcement learning approaches. The
B-logit algorithm has the slowest execution time, as it slowly updates the action
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probabilities (Eq. 3.3a, 3.3b) compared to the Max-logit algorithm (Eq. 3.3c, 3.3d).
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Conclusions

In this work, an artificially intelligent system to support the data offloading system
for UAVs in a multi-MEC server environment is devised and evaluated through the
use of game theory and reinforcement learning. In particular, a non-cooperative
game among the UAVs is formulated to determine the UAVs data offloading scheme
to the MEC servers and the existence of at least on NE is proven. A best response
dynamics framework as well as two alternative reinforcement learning algorithms
were introduced towards proving the existence of a NE point for the data offloading game; additionally, a reinforcement learning algorithm based on the theory of
stochastic learning automata was introduced for the purpose of autonomous MEC
server selection by the UAVs.
To handle the UAVs data offloading scheme we initially introduced the BRD
algorithm. This algorithm proved to converge to a NE point with respect to the UAVs
average offloaded bits and corresponding utility. The BRD algorithm converged
in a relatively fast manner, and the algorithm presented is characterized by a low
complexity. Alternatively, two reinforcement learning algorithms, namely Max-logit
and B-logit, were introduced; these algorithms have no data exchange between the
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UAVs and, instead have an exploration phase to better learn the available strategy
space. Both RL approaches proved to converge to an NE point; however, the cost of
removing the information exchange between the UAVs is a longer convergence time.
Furthermore, it is shown that the Max-logit algorithm not only converges faster than
the B-logit algorithm, but also it converges to an overall better NE point with regards
to the amount of offloaded data. Lastly, when comparing the BRD algorithm to the
Max-logit algorithm the data shows that Max-logit tends to once again converge to
a better NE point with regards to the amount of offloaded data.
To handle the MEC server selection portion of the system a reinforcement learning
algorithm based on the theory of stochastic learning automata was introduced. In
each time slot of the SLA either the BRD or one of the RL algorithms is run. It
has been proven that under the Max-logit algorithm the UAVs achieve a better NE
among those available, whereas under the BRD algorithm the convergence time is
much faster. Therefore, the optimal solution for the mulit-UAV multi-MEC server
environment in terms of autonomous MEC server selection and data offloading is to
run Max-logit inside the SLA per time slot. The overall framework was evaluated
via modeling and simulation, in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness,by studying
multiple operation approaches and scenarios.
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